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This paper examines strategic incentives to subsidize green energy in a group of countries that 
operates an international carbon emissions trading scheme. Welfare-maximizing national 
governments have the option to discriminate against energy from fossil fuels by subsidizing 
green energy, although in our model green energy promotion is not efficiency enhancing. The 
cases of small and large countries turn out to exhibit significantly differences. While small 
countries refrain from subsidizing green energy and thus implement the efficient allocation, 
large permit-importing countries subsidize green energy in order to influence the permit price 
in their favor. 
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1    Introduction 
In 2005 the European Union established an EU-wide CO2 emissions trading system to 
reduce its greenhose gas emissions by 8 % in 2012 from its baseline emissions in 1990. 
Similarly, in August 2007 the Western Climate Initiative, launched by seven US states and 
four Canadian provinces, planned to lay the foundation for an international emissions trad-
ing scheme that involves both the United States and Canada and pursues the goal of reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions by 15 % from 2005 levels by 2020.   
Countries under the umbrella of an international emissions trading scheme, e.g. the EU 
member states, are observed to promote green energy by feed-in tariffs or green tradable 
certificates. Feed-in tariffs (or renewable energy tariffs) are output subsidies per unit of 
produced energy (Menanteau et al. 2003) and green certificates are tradable commodities 
'earned' by green energy producers for each unit of their output which producers of black 
energy are then obliged to purchase in some proportion to their output. Feed-in tariffs are 
in operation in 63 jurisdictions around the world, including Canada, France, Germany, and 
in a dozen states in the United States. National trading schemes of green certificates are in 
use in e.g. the UK, Italy and some US states. 
International emissions trading schemes aim at coping with climate change by curbing 
greenhouse gas emissions, but the economic rationale for promoting green energy is less 
clear. The literature suggests two justifications for combining emissions control with green 
energy promotion policies. In the presence of learning spillovers
1 subsidizing the use of 
renewable energy is efficiency enhancing especially in their innovatory phase in order to 
spur learning effects that are beneficial for renewable energy producers as well as for soci-
ety at large (Bläsi and Requate 2007, Fischer and Newall 2008, Lehmann 2009). The sec-
ond justification is energy security, i.e. the reduction of the dependence from insecure fos-
sil fuel imports. Assuming uncertainty about the import price of fossil fuel, Eichner and 
Pethig (2009b) show that risk averse governments of small open economies may choose to 
subsidize green energy to reduce the price uncertainty. 
The present paper suggests and investigates another rationale for subsidizing green en-
ergy. Countries may have a strategic incentive to use (positive or negative) green subsidies 
                                                 
1  Learning spillovers are related to technological or R&D spillovers. For an analysis of technological spill-




in order to manipulate in their favour the permit price. To make this thesis precise, we con-
sider a group of countries operating joint emissions trading scheme. Each country produces 
green energy with a domestic resource and black energy by means of fossil fuel imported 
from the rest of the world. The domestic resource is also used for the production of an in-
ternationally tradable composite consumer good. 
Focussing on competitive economies and welfare-maximizing governments, we show 
that it is efficient for the group of countries to refrain from subsidizing green energy. The 
governments of small open countries who take as given the price in the international permit 
market find it optimal not to subsidize green energy and thus also secure efficiency from 
the viewpoint of the group of countries. In contrast, governments of large countries are 
aware that their policy affects the permit price and therefore find it optimal to use the sub-
sidy for distorting the permit price in their favor while behaving Nash with regard to the 
other countries’ subsidies. The strategic incentives to promote green energy differ mark-
edly between permit-exporting and permit-importing countries. 
In the field of international environmental economics strategic choice of environmental 
policy instruments has been investigated e.g. by Barrett (1994), Rauscher (1994) and Ulph 
(1996). There is only a small literature, however, that investigates strategic incentives of 
national regulation in the context of international emissions trading. In Bréchet and Peralta 
(2008) and Eichner and Pethig (2009a) national governments levy energy or emissions 
taxes to manipulate the permit price in their favor. In Santore et al. (2003) national regula-
tors impose emissions taxes and tariffs to affect the permit price in a model with spillovers. 
We are not aware of contributions to the literature that explore – as we aim to do in the 
present paper – the interaction of international emissions trading and national green energy 
promotion policies. 
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 char-
acterizes the efficient allocation and the first-best policy-supported competitive equilib-
rium for the group of countries. Section 4 analyzes subsidy competition for the small-
country case of governments which ignore the impact of their policy on the permit price 
and for the large-country case of governments which account for the impact of their poli-





2    The model 
  Consider a group of n countries embedded in the world economy. All countries in that 
group participate in an international CO2 emissions trading scheme to be specified below. 
Country  1,..., i n   =      employs the resource input  xi r  to produce the amount  si x  of a con-
sumer good (good X), the same in all countries, according to the production function 
( )
i
si xi x X r = .  (1) 
Moreover, country i produces energy, 
si si si z b g = + ,  (2) 
consisting of black energy  si b  and green energy  si g . Both kinds of energy are considered 
in (2) to be perfect substitutes, for simplicity. Black energy is generated from fossil fuel  i e , 
( )
i
si i b B e = ,  (3) 
and green energy is produced with the resource input  gi r  via 
( )
i
si gi g G r = .  (4) 
The production functions  , and
i i i X B G are strictly increasing and strictly concave in their 
arguments. The representative consumer of country i derives utility 
( ) ,
i
i i i u U x z =   (5) 
from consuming  i x  units of good X and the amount  i z  of energy. The utility function 
i U  
is strictly increasing in both arguments and quasi-concave. 
  CO2 emissions are proportional to the input of fossil fuel and therefore we simply use  i e  
to denote the fuel input as well as CO2 emissions. The group of countries as a whole has 
committed to restrict its total carbon emissions to some level  0 c > . To meet that emis-
sions target  c , the countries take part in a joint emissions trading scheme. Each country i 
is assigned a national emissions cap  i c  such that  j jc c = ∑ . The national emissions caps 




j j j j e c = ∑ ∑ ,  (6) 
is brought about by the permit price  e π . Good X and fossil fuel are traded on world mar-
kets at prices  x p  and  e p , respectively, which all countries take as given. Energy and the 
resource are traded on domestic markets in each country i at prices  zi p  and  ri p , respec-
tively. The conditions for clearing those markets are 
i si z z =    and    xi gi i r r r + = ,  (7) 
where  i r  is the resource endowment of country i owned by its representative consumer. 
With this information, country i's balance of payments (current account) is 
( ) ( ) 0. e i i x si i e i c e p x x p e π − + − −   =   (8) 
 
3    Allocative (in)efficiency and green subsidies 
  In this section we determine the Pareto efficient allocation via maximizing the weighted 
sum of utilities under the constraints (1) – (4), (6), (7) and  ( ) 0 x sj j e j j p x x p e     − − =   ∑ . 
The last equation is the group’s consolidated trade balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
We use that constraint rather than all countries' trade balances (8) to characterize the effi-
cient allocation, because owing to (6) summing (8) over all countries yields 
( ) ( ) e j j x sj j e j j c e p x x p e π     − + − − =   ∑ ( ) 0 x sj j e j j p x x p e     − − =   ∑ . 
The efficient allocation is a solution to the Lagrangean 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
j j j
j j j zj j gj j e j j j j j L U x z B e G r z c e α λ λ   = + + − + −   ∑ ∑ ∑  + 
      +  ( ) ( ) ( )
j
t x xj j e j rj j gj xj j j p X r x p e r r r λ λ   − −   + − −   ∑ ∑ , 
where  , j e c p    and  x p  are positive constants,  , , zj e t λ λ λ      and  rj λ  are Lagrange multipliers and 
j α  denote constant positive welfare weights. Simple calculations show that the allocation 














= ,    and    
i




where  : zi zi t µ λ λ  =   and   : e e t µ λ λ  = . The first equation in (9) is the rule for efficient con-
sumption, the second and third equations are rules for efficient production. The equation 
i
zi e e e B p µ µ = +   reflects  the  well-known  efficiency  requirement  of  equalizing  marginal 
abatement costs across countries. 
  Next we assess the efficiency properties of competitive markets when the emissions 
trading scheme is in operation and green energy is subsidized. For that purpose, we intro-
duce a green energy subsidy
2 (subsidy, for short) in each country i at rate
3  i s , and consider 
the price taking agents' optimization plans: The producers of good X, green energy and 
black energy maximize profits
4  
( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
i i
xi x xi ri xi gi zi i gi ri gi p X r p r p s G r p r φ φ = −        = +   −       ( ) ( ) i e i i e i
i
zi bi e p c e e B p − − − = π φ , 
respectively, and the consumer maximizes her utility (5) subject to the budget constraint 
x i zi i p x p z +  ≤ 
* * *
ri i xi gi bi i si p r s g φ φ φ   + + + − , where 
*
xi φ , 
*
gi φ     and 
*
bi φ  are maximum profits and 
where  i si s g  is a lumpsum tax levied on the consumer and used to subsidize green energy 
















    and    
i
zi e e e p B p π = + .  (10) 
  From comparing the equations (9) and (10) immediately follows 
 
Proposition 1.  The competitive equilibrium of the n-country economy with emissions trad-
ing and subsidy rates ( ) 1,..., n s s  is efficient, if and only if  1 ... 0. n s s =   = =    
 
                                                 
2 As mentioned above (Section 1), in practice green energy promotion often takes the form of feed-in tariffs 
or green certificates schemes. However, at the high level of abstraction of our model the incidence of these 
policy schemes is the same as that of government subsidies. 
3 The rate  i s  is not sign-constrained. To avoid clumsy wording, we refer to  i s  not only if  i s  > 0, but also if 
i s  < 0, in which case it is a tax on green energy rather than a subsidy (in the narrow sense). 
4 According to the definition of  bi φ  the producer of black energy gets the permit endowment  i c  for free. The 
alternative assumption of auctioning permits would leave the results unchanged at the high level of abstrac-




  The clear message of Proposition 1 is that for the group of countries as a whole, subsi-
dies are distortionary and render inefficient the equilibrium allocation. That result does not 
come as a surprise because, given the emissions trading scheme, there are no externalities 
or other market imperfections in our n-country economy and therefore any subsidy or tax 
(based on endogenous economic variables) is bound to reduce the welfare of the group of 
countries. If curbing emissions is considered the only policy target and if group efficiency 
is an agreed-upon target, Proposition 1 advises governments to abstain from subsidizing 
green energy altogether. It is not clear, though, whether green energy subsidies are also 
unfavorable from the viewpoint of individual countries whose governments (also) consider 
curbing emissions as the only policy target but focus on national welfare rather than on 
group efficiency. We will address that issue in the next section. 
 
4    Subsidy competition 
  The small country case. Consider first a small open country i whose government has at 
its disposal a green energy subsidy, takes the permit price  e π  as given and aims at maxi-
mizing its country’s welfare defined as its representative consumer’s utility. The compara-
tive static effects of a change in  i s  and  e π  (derived in the Appendix A) on country i’s wel-





i i i i i i i e
i
u
s s c e s α β π
λ







i i zi r






   
= + − >    
   




i i i zi ee zi r
i e
i i i i
c e p B p G
B
x z x D
β
    −
 = + −    
   




i i i i zi r r
i e i ee i zi ee r
i i i i
p X G
D B B p B G
x z x z
σ γ
     
= + − − +    >      
     
,   ( ) : 0
i i
i rr zi i rr X p s G γ = − − + > . 
The government of country i takes the permit price as given (which means that we set d e π  
= 0 in (11)) and chooses its subsidy such that d 0 i u = . The straightforward conclusion 
from (11) is 
 
                                                 
5 We introduce these terms (and some more below) to improve the readability of the paper. The list of all 




Proposition 2. (Small country case). If the government of country i seeks to maximize na-
tional welfare taking the permit price as given, it refrains from subsidizing green energy. 
 
  According to Proposition 2, the competitive equilibrium without subsidies is therefore 
not only efficient from the viewpoint of the group of countries (Proposition 1) but also 
welfare  maximizing  from  the  viewpoint  of  individual  governments  of  small  countries 
(Proposition 2) capable to subsidize green energy. 
  The large country case. Now we turn to green energy subsidies in a group of large open 
countries whose welfare maximizing governments account for the influence of their policy 
on the permit price  e π . Analogous to our procedure in the small country case, we envisage 
an individual country i and explore that country's change in welfare when subsidy rates 
vary. In contrast to (11), however, the government now takes into account in its optimiza-
tion calculus how the equilibrium permit price changes in response to variations in its own 






i i i i i i i j
i j
u





= − + − −  ∑ .  (12) 
  To determine the differential quotients  d /d e j s π  we need to re-consider the fossil fuel 
consumption,  ( ) ,
i
i e i e E s π = , of a country i that takes as given both the subsidy  i s  and the 
permit price  e π
6, and we then need to specify how  i e  varies in response to small exoge-






i i i i r r r
s e i e
i i i i
e X G G
E B B





= = − + ⋅ = − <  
∂   14 4 244 3






i i i i
i i i i zi e i i r r r
i i
i i i zi i i
x c e p B X G G
E






  − −     = − + − = − +  
  1444 4 24444 3 14 4 244 3
.  (14) 
                                                 
6  ( ) ,
i
e i E s π  is the equilibrium quantity of fossil fuel consumption, if and only if 
e π  is the equilibrium per-




From (14) it is straightforward that  0 i ζ ≥  and hence  0
e
i Eπ < ,  if i i c e ≤ . However, for 
permit-exporting countries the sign of  i ζ  is unclear. Later we will examine in some detail 
the determinants of the sign of 
e
i Eπ  for permit-exporting countries because that sign will 
play an important role for the conclusions to be derived. 
  Next we rewrite equation (6) as  ( ) ,
j
e j j j j E s c π = ∑ ∑  and observe that after some 




e j e Eπ π =∑   d 0
j
j







j j e j s j j
e j
j j j j









,  (15) 






i i i i i e i
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  − −
  = − + 






i i i i j e j j i
j j j






.  (16) 
  To characterize government i's best reply to given subsidy rates of all other countries we 






i i i i i e i
i i j j j







,  (17) 
where   ( ) :
i
i i j j i i e j B η α δ ζ βδ  = + − ∑   =   ( )
2 i i
i zi ee r
i j j i j i j
i
p B G δ
α δ ζ ζ
γ
≠ + − ∑ ∑   or 
( ) i i j j i i j i η α δ ζ θζ




i i i zi ee r
i
i




= > .  (18) 
























  The conclusion to be drawn from (19) crucially depends on the sign of  i η . As  , i i α δ  and 
i θ  are positive for all i, while  i ζ  may but need not be negative for permit-exporting coun-
tries, the sign of  i η  is unclear.  0 i ζ >  for all i is an obvious sufficient condition for  0 i η >  
(and for  0
e
i Eπ <  as well). However, we wish to make use of weaker conditions for  0 i η > . 
First we impose the constraint  ( ) 0
e
i
i i Eπ δ ζ = − + <  for all i rather than  0 i ζ >  for all i and 
we will demonstrate later that  0
e
i Eπ <  does not appear to be an unreasonably strong re-
striction. Closer inspection of (14) shows that  0
e
i Eπ <  for all i is equivalent to  
i i i
i i r r i r i i
i i
i i i i i e zi i e
c e X G xG x




< + +  
 
   for i = 1, …, n.  (20) 
  The  right  side  of  that  inequality  is  positive  so  that  (20)  is  satisfied  for  all  permit-
exporting countries for which ( )/ i i i c e e −  is not too large. ( )/ i i i c e e −  is the permit export 
as a share of domestic permit use. Unfortunately, (20) still leaves the sign of  i η  ambigu-
ous. We therefore need to introduce " 0 i η >  for i = 1, …, n" as a second constraint which 
can be shown to be equivalent to the inequality  
( ) i i i j j j i i i i i
i i
i zi i e i i e i
x D c e x
e p e B e B




  for i = 1, …, n.  (21) 
When combined with (20) which is equivalent to  0 > + i i ζ δ , the right side of (21) is posi-
tive and greater than  /
i
i i zi i e x p e B σ . From this observation combined with (19) follows im-
mediately 
 
Proposition 3. (Large country case). Suppose the governments of all countries seek to 
maximize national welfare and account for the impact of their green energy subsidy on the 
permit price. If the Nash equilibrium in subsidy rates of the n-country economy satisfies 
(20) and (21), the equilibrium subsidy of country i is characterized by 





  According to (22) the government of country i chooses  0 i s >  [ 0 i s < ] if and only if 
country i imports [exports] permits. The permit-importing country has an incentive to sub-
sidize green energy ( 0 i s > ) to discourage its black energy production as well as its fossil 
fuel consumption and generation of emissions. The drop in the demand for permits lowers 
both the permit price and the need for permits and thus the county's permit import bill. 
That is welfare enhancing up to some point where the distortion in production compensates 
the advantage of raising the subsidy. Conversely, the permit-exporting country applies a 
negative subsidy (= tax) on green energy ( 0 i s < ) to stimulate black energy production and 
with it the country's permit demand. The intention is to raise the permit price which then 
increases national income via rising revenues form permit exports. The net advantage of 
successive increases in the tax rate diminishes because of rising distortions in production. 
Note that production inefficiencies result whenever  0 i s ≠ , and that the distortions are par-
ticularly severe because s is negative for some countries and positive for others. 
  Negative green energy subsidies (= taxes) do not appear to be a relevant issue in practi-
cal policy although they may be found as (possibly unintended) side effects of complex 
regulation. Assuming that negative subsidies are not viable, e.g. because of strong resis-
tance from green lobby groups, the governments of permit-exporting countries can be con-
ceived to maximize welfare under the additional constraint  0 i s ≥ . Their optimal choice 
would then be  0 i s = . In other words, if taxing green energy is not feasible permit- export-
ing countries have strong strategic incentives not to promote green energy. 
 
5      How restrictive are the preconditions of Proposition 3? 
  It is not easy to see how general the result of Proposition 3 is, i.e. how severe the restric-
tions (20) and (21) are for the result (22). To assess that issue it is convenient to focus on 
condition (20) – rather than on (21) or on both conditions - and examine the order of mag-
nitude of the right side of the inequality (20) which reads 
i i i
r r i r i i
i i
i i i i e zi i e
X G xG x




+ +  
 
.  (23) 











zi i i i i i r r i ri i ri
r r
i i i i i zi i i i zi i i
p s z x X G x p x p
X G
x z x z x p s z x p s z
  + +  
+ = + = + = ⋅       + +    
. 
    ( ) :
i i
i rr zi i rr X p s G γ  = − − +  







= +  
 














ε = − . 























ε = . 
turn (23) into 
( )
( ) ( )
{{{ {{ {




zi i i i r i x i
i bi bi xi gi
zi i i ri i zi i e e gi xi rr rr
p s z x g p x
p s z p b p b r r
ε
σ
ε ε ε ε
    + +
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅    
+ +         1442443 1442443
  (24) 
  What do we know about the order of magnitude of the terms [1] through [8] in (24)? 
The term [1] is much larger than one, because the value of energy, ( ) zi i i p s z + , is far less 
than the value  i x i x p x =  of the composite consumer good X. In term [2] the ratio ( ) / gi xi r r  
is significantly smaller than one, and the elasticities 
gi
rr ε  and  
xi
rr ε  are in the interval ] [ 0,1  
for iso-elastic production functions. Hence [2] can be expected to be greater than or close 
to one, and [3] 1 ≈  is also plausible. To determine a lower bound for [4] we make use of 





> . For an iso-elastic production function 
si xi x r









− = . Since  xi r  tends to grow with increasing re-
source endowment,  i r , [4] will be larger than one for sufficiently large  i r . Summing up, 
the product [1] [2] [3] [4] ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  can be safely assumed to be much larger than one. However, the 
term [5] is far smaller than one which makes it very difficult to place a reliable number on 
the entire product [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . Nonetheless our above arguments lead us to consider 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≈  a reasonable and rather low estimate.  
  Consider next the product [6] [7] [8] ⋅ ⋅ . Since  ] [ 0,1
bi
e ε ∈ , the term [6] in (24) is clearly 
greater than one. The term [7] is significantly larger than one because good X represents all 




GDP only 5-8% (EAI 2008).
7 Consequently, even if we allow for small values of  i σ , say 
values well below one, the product [6] [7] [8] ⋅ ⋅  is still likely to be larger than one. Hence 
we consider [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  + [6] [7] [8] 2 ⋅ ⋅ ≈  a very coarse but fairly conservative esti-
mate for the entire term in (24). If we consider 
i i i
r r i r i i
i i
i i i i e zi i e
X G xG x




+ +  
 
 = 2 in (20), we 
find that Proposition 3 covers Nash equilibria in which permit-exporting countries do not 
export more than two thirds (67%) of their permit endowment,  i c . In the emissions trading 
scheme of the European Union no country comes even close to an export share of permits 
exceeding 60%. (Trotignon and Delbosc 2008). In light of these plausibility arguments 
(guided by stylized empirical estimates) the condition (20) does not appear to be unrea-
sonably restrictive at all. 
  So far we have restricted our attention on the constraint (20). Obviously, if (21) rather 
than (20) is binding for some permit-exporting countries, Proposition 3 is somewhat less 
general than suggested by our discussion of (24) above. Nonetheless, even in that case the 
inequalities (20) and (21) are still less restrictive than the alternative constraint that is suf-
ficient for reaching the conclusion (22), namely the condition  0 i ζ >  for i = 1, …, n or 
    i i i i
i
i zi i e
c e x
e p e B
σ −
<    for i = 1, …, n. 
  The preceding discussion showed that  ( ) 0
e
i
i i Eπ δ ζ = − + <  is not unrealistic for permit- 
exporting countries. To reinforce that assessment we wish to identify the economic drivers 
of the sign of 
e
i Eπ  by reference to the comparative statics of the small open economy car-
ried out in the Appendix A. According to that analysis, in permit-exporting and -importing 
countries alike
8  0 > ∆ e π  stimulates green energy production, reduces the production of 
good X, and raises the consumer price of energy,  zi p , while the consumer good price  x p  
remains constant by assumption. Total energy consumption – and with it necessarily black 
energy production – shrinks unambiguously only, when the country imports permits. Un-
der the plausible assumption that the income elasticities of energy and good X are positive, 
                                                 
7 EIA (2008) reports that over 2000-2008 in the US the total energy expenditures per GDP lie between 6 and 
9 %. Since the share of black energy is 90%, the black energy share of GDP amounts to 5 to 8%.   




0 > ∆ i z  follows from  0 > ∆ e π  in permit-exporting countries, if and only if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
(a)   National income must rise to generate a positive income effect  0 > ∆
I
i z ; 
(b)    The negative substitution effect  0 < ∆
S
i z  due to  ( ) 0 / > ∆ x zi p p  must not overcom- 
    pensate




i i z z z . 
Even if these conditions hold
10, black energy and emissions need not necessarily increase, 
however, because  0 > ∆ + ∆ = ∆ i i i g b z  may be brought about by  0 > ∆ i g and  0 < ∆ i b . 
Therefore,  0
e
i Eπ <  appears to be likely for all permit-exporting countries. 
 
6      Concluding remarks 
  The present paper suggests that strategic incentives may be a rationale for subsidizing 
green energy when countries operate a joint emissions trading scheme. Welfare maximiz-
ing governments of large countries put a positive or negative subsidy on green energy in 
order to manipulate the permit price. Subsidy competition of small countries turns out to be 
efficient from the perspective of the group of countries, since all countries refrain from 
green  energy  subsidies.  In  contrast,  subsidy  competition  of  large  countries  renders  the 
multi-country economy inefficient. In that case the policy implication is 'subsidy harmoni-
zation at the level zero'. 
Finally, it must be kept in mind that the simple assumptions of our stylized model put 
some limits on the generality of results. E.g., energy production takes place under perfect 
competition which is in stark contrast to energy markets in the real world. The analysis of 
monopolistic or oligopolistic energy producers is therefore an important task for future 
research. Also, we assume that energy is traded on domestic markets only and no fossil 
fuel is supplied in any country of the group. These assumptions may be considered accept-
able as a first approximation, e.g. for the European Union, but it is necessary to examine 
                                                 
9 For any given price change  ( ) 0 / > ∆ x zi p p , the substitution effect  0 < ∆
S
i z  is the smaller in absolute 
terms the smaller is the elasticity of substitution in demand,  i σ . 
10 It is interesting to observe that if the income elasticities of energy and good X are positive and the condi-
tions (a) and (b) hold, then the consumption of good X increases along with energy consumption and there-




the robustness of our results with respect to deviations from these assumptions in order to 
improve our understanding of strategic incentives for or against promoting green energy. 
 
Appendix 
A: Comparative statics of the small open economy 
For convenience of notation, we suppress the index i, when there is no risk of confusion, 
and we set equal to one the price of good X ( 1 x p ≡ ). For given  , , e x c r p p     ,  ≡1  and  e π  an 
equilibrium of the small open economy
11 is constituted by prices  , r z p p    and an allocation 
( ) , , , , , , , , s s g x s s b e g r r s x z z                such that ( ) , , , , , , , , s s g x s s b e g r r x x z z                  is a solution to the agents’ 
optimization  problems  and  the  constraints  (6)  and  (7)  hold.  The  12  variables 
, , , , , , , , , , ,and s s g x s s r z b e g r r x x z z p p λ                          are determined by the 12 equations  
( ) s b B e = ,     s s s z b g = + ,    ( ) r x r X r p = ,          ( ) ( ) 0 e s e c e x x p e π − + − − = , 
( ) s g g G r = ,    s z z = ,        ( ) ( ) z r g r p s G r p + = ,    ( ) , x U x z λ = , 
( ) s x x X r = ,    x g r r r = + ,     ( ) z e e e p B e p π = + ,      ( ) , z z U x z p λ = . 
To obtain information on how that equilibrium depends on the subsidy s and on the permit 
price  e π , we will consider the impact of small changes in those parameters on the equilib-
rium.  For  that  purpose  we  eliminate  the  variables  , , , , , and s s x s s r b g r x z z p λ           ,       in  the  12 
equations listed above through substitution thus condensing the 12 equations into the four 
equations 
( ) ( ) 0, e x g e c e p X r r x p e π   − + − − − =     (A1) 
( ) ( ) ( ), r g z r g X r r p s G r − = +   (A2) 
( ) , z e e e p B e p π = +   (A3) 
                                                 
11 Note that the equilibrium of the small open economy is not an equilibrium of the n-country economy. The 
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U x B e G r
p U x B e G r
  +   =
  +  
  (A4) 
that  determine  the  endogenous  variables  , , and . g z e r x p          Total  differentiation  of  these 
equations yields 
( ) d d d d , z e r g e p B e X r x c e π + + = −   (A5) 
d d d , g r z r r G p G s γ − =   (A6) 
d d d , z ee e z e p B e B p π +   =   (A7) 
d
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 is the substitution elasticity and  ( ) : 0. x rr z rr p X p s G γ  = − − + >  
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  (A9) 
We solve the equation system (A9) by using Cramer’s rule and obtain after some rear-




z z ee e
z e
p p B
p B c e
x z x D
γ π
γ








  + +  
 








e c e G
x p x z D
γ γσ π     = − − − +    








  − +     
 





1 d z z e
g e r r ee
p p
dr B G G B c e
x z x D




e r r ee
p s
B G G B
x z D
σ
    + + −             





e ee z r ee
p X G
D B B p G B
x z x z
γ σγ      = + − − +    >    
   
 
Next, we insert (A11) and (A12) in  d d d d s e r g z z B e G r = = +  to obtain after rearrangements 
of terms 
( ) ( )
2 2 2
2 2 1 d d
d d .
e r e e r
s e z r ee e
z
sB G sB G s
z z B c e c e p G B B




= =   − − −      −   − −    
 
  (A13) 





σ = +    we obtain 
( ) ( )
2 2
2 d e e r
z r ee
c e B c e x sB G
p G B
x z z xz
γ  −   −
= −     − 

( )
d e ee e a B a B
c e
x x D




r r e r
r ee
X G sB G s
G B
x z xz D
σ
    + + −      
   
  (A14) 
The comparative static results of the small open economy are summarized in Table 1: 
 
  d z p   d , d s e b   d , d g s r g   d x r   d s x   d , d s z z   dx 
d 0 s >   −  −  +  −  −  −  − 
d 0, e c e π >   >   +  ?  +  −  −  ?  ? 
d 0, e c e π >   <   +  −  +  −  −  −  ? 
 
            Table 1: The comparative statics of the small open economy  
                  (Assumption:  0
i i
e i ee B e B + >
12) 
Finally, we insert  dx from (A5) and  d d d z z e z r g p z p B e p G r = +  into  d d d x z u U x U z = +  and 
use  x z z U U p λ = =  and (A2) to obtain 
                                                 
12 If the production function takes the form  ( )
i m i
i i B e e =  with  ] [ 0,1 i m ∈ , then ( )
i i
e i ee B e B +  =  0 i m > . The 
functional form 
i
i i b e






d d . r g e
u
sG r c e π
λ
= −     + −   (A15) 
With d g r  from (A12) we turn (A15) into (11). 
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